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This thesis examines the index premium phenomenon in Nordic stock markets during 2008-2020 
using two event dates for each inclusion and exclusion in a sample of 819 events in total from 18 
indices focused on Nordic stock markets. In addition to classic short term event study, this thesis 
extends it with long term windows following Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) in order to capture long 
term behaviour of abnormal prices with regards to the two event dates for each inclusion and 
exclusion.  
 
The empirical results show abnormal price action around small cap and the entire region spanning 
index composition change announcements for affected stocks as well as the abnormal price action of 
affected stocks as the composition change is which they are excluded is implemented. The reaction to 
exclusion is larger in magnitude and behaves differently to that of inclusions. For changes in country 
specific blue chip indices no abnormal price action is detected.  
 
Although minor index premium as found in this thesis is expected based on the previous theoretical 
and empirical literature, the behaviour of the premium found here is contradictory to previous 
literature.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
In finance, a taxi driver talking about his investments is often used as an analogy to a 
situation when irrational exuberance is at its peak and the ‘top is in.’ However, when 
it comes to passive investing or long-term investment in cost-effective index funds it 
is not only the layman but also the finance professionals repeating the mantra. In my 
experience, it is not uncommon for some people to even think that at some time 
somewhere monkeys have actually been given darts in order to find out whether by 
throwing them they could pick stocks better than professional money managers. 
Passive investing in ETF’s and index-tracking funds has seen major growth during 
the current decade. In fact, according to Morningstar, the number of US-based index 
funds and ETF’s surpassed the number of US-based actively managed investment 
funds in August of 2019. According to JP Morgan, 60% of US equities are controlled 
by passive investments such as index funds and ETF’s. 
Because unquestioned truths are the ones in need of questioning this thesis takes a 
look at market efficiency and the conclusion about it in favour of passive investment 
from the point of view of a side effect they cause: the index premium. 
Index premium refers to a price premium a stock gains (loses) when entering 
(exiting) an index. Based on research and intuition, index premium is caused by 
excess demand from index tracking investors for stocks that are included in indices 
they follow, although some theories based on informational benefits and signals of 
index inclusion are supported. As index composition changes are easily forecasted 
for most indices, forecastable excess demand from indexers could create 
opportunities for arbitrage that indexers would pay for via index turnover cost caused 
by stock prices being inflated with index premium when entering the index and 
deflated when exiting.  
Although index premium as a research subject has been somewhat forgotten during 
the 2010s the ever-increasing popularity of passive investing as an investing style 
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makes it worthwhile to examine whether passive investing has had an impact on 
index premium, and whether the index premium has an impact on passive investing 
returns.  
Nordics are an interesting region for studying index premium for various reasons. 
Nordic countries are small developed countries in northern Europe with close 
geographical, historical, and cultural ties. As small economies with small capital 
markets Nordic stock markets assumedly appear to foreign investors as similar to 
ones of some emerging markets with small and obscure companies with little analyst 
coverage. Being this kind of developed emerging market underlines the possible 
informational benefits of index inclusion as foreign capital is less likely to analyze 
Nordic non-index stocks as a potential investment or at all.  
1.2 Earlier Studies 
The efficient market hypothesis, first formulated by Fama (1970) expanding on the 
work of Kendal (1953) Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1965), is such a cornerstone theory 
in finance that even when it and its predecessors dominated academic literature for 
near 20 years only, the debate goes on to this date. Jensen’s (1978) practically and 
theoretically appealing formulation of efficient market hypothesis states that if for 
some reason markets presented an opportunity for earning risk-adjusted excess 
returns, arbitrageurs would exploit it until it diminishes to an extent at which risk-
adjusted excess returns can no longer be achieved.  
Another view on the same issue lies around a theoretical concept of market portfolio 
m as in Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1965). According to Malkiel (2003b), each time an 
investor buys or sells an asset the counterparty of that trade is an investor who sells 
or buys that asset. Therefore, in aggregate any profitable trade is offset by an equally 
unprofitable trade and while the return of the market portfolio m is the expected 
return for both, both lose the transaction costs of their trades.  
Combining these views leads to a conclusion that when an investor thinks he has 
found an untapped arbitrage opportunity he is just as likely to be wrong and thus 
rational conclusion is to abstain from active trading as it is only expected to yield the 
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costs it causes. As a result, an entire industry of passive investment products has 
risen to exploit this conclusion. 
However, as any market, neither the stock market consists of homogenous and 
rational investors and none can see into future. In the 1980’s Schiller (1980) and 
Schiller and Campbell (1988) pioneered a branch of finance literature in favour of 
possibility of long term forecastability in stock returns. Regardless the misconception 
that stock returns are unpredictable in all timeframes and the empirical evidence 
about active managers generally underperforming their benchmark indices after costs 
have led to popularity of passive investing style both in academia and in practice 
which relies on replicating the performance of indices while minimizing 
management related costs. Indices are essentially diversified portfolios of assets that 
represent the performance of a market or a segment of a market. As the pioneering 
work of Markowitz (1952) shows, diversification of assets is an integral part of 
rational portfolio management. Later work regarding diversification shows that the 
optimal number of securities in a well diversified portfolio is nowadays close to 300 
(Statman, 2004) and achieving such portfolio practically requires utilization of index 
tracking mutual funds or ETFs.  
Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986) pioneered the literature on the effects of 
index tracking capital on stock prices. Shleifer (1986) assumes that stocks have a 
long-term downward sloping demand curves due to individual stocks not having 
close substitutes in terms of company and performance characteristics (imperfect 
substitutes hypothesis) and finds supporting evidence in form of persistent price 
impacts during S&P 500 composition changes caused by non-fundamental demand 
shocks from indexers. Harris and Gurel (1986) present price pressure hypothesis that 
assume only short-term downward sloping demand curves for which they find 
supporting evidence in form of price shocks to S&P 500 composition changes that 
reverse quickly.  
Multiple theories for the index premium explain it by the information the index 
membership carries. According to Jain (1987), inclusion in an index is a sign that the 
company is managed well and expected to perform well in the future (information 
hypothesis). He finds that even in events where stocks are included in indices that are 
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not tracked by passive investors stocks have a positive price response. Chung, 
McInish, Wood & Wyhowski (1995) argue that stocks included in indices are 
followed by more analysts and as a result the market has less asymmetric information 
about them decreasing spreads and increasing liquidity justifying higher price 
(liquidity hypothesis). Denis, McConnel, Ovtchinnikov, and Yu (2003) argue that 
index premium might be a result of investors being unaware of the existence of 
stocks that are not included in indices and of Merton’s (1987) shadow cost (investor 
awareness hypothesis) Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) also find supporting 
evidence for investor awareness hypothesis in form of positive price increase caused 
by index inclusions and lack of similar negative price effect for exclusions which 
they conclude to support the idea that investors do not forget the companies when 
they are excluded from indices.  
According to Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) index premium is at least partly due 
to idiosyncratic risk in stocks during index composition changes. Petajisto (2011) 
arrives at a similar conclusion but argues that arbitrage risk does not entirely explain 
the index premium he finds in the S&P 500 and in Russell 2000.  
Petajisto (2011) formalizes ‘index turnover cost’ based on the notion that some 
earlier studies such as Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) have made: If stocks enter the 
index at price inflated by the index premium and exit them after the premium has 
reversed, the index’s return decreases as a function of its turnover and the size of the 
premium.  
Morck and Yang (2001) find that the index premium phenomenon has increased 
along with the increasing popularity of passive investing during the latter half of the 
20
th
 century. Using newer data Petajisto (2011) however finds that since 2000 the 
magnitude of index premium decreased until 2005 which remains the most current 
well cited empirical research paper on this topic.  
Most studies have focused on the the S&P 500 index which is the main blue chip 
index in US stock markets. However, the S&P 500 is constructed by using a 
undisclosed methodology and as such is a somewhat exceptional index. The S&P 
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500 announcements are difficult to forecast while most other indices use transparent 
construction rules and are easily forecastable and thus front-runnable.  
1.3 Research Problem and Methodology 
This thesis re-examines the index premium phenomenon by using current data from 
2008-2020 and focuses on previously disregarded or unnoticed Nordic stock markets. 
The goal of the thesis is to find whether Nordic stock markets exhibit the index 
premium phenomenon and how it behaves. The research question is intentionally left 
open ended so that it will not impose limits on obtaining a general view about the 
phenomenon.  
Like most early studies about index premium this thesis uses a classic event study 
methodology. While it is not the most contemporary methodology for studying 
effects or multiple events, it is an appropriate methodology to use in a revisit of the 
index premium studying branch of literature that has become less active in the past 
decade. Following Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) this thesis extends simple short-
term event study with a long-term window analysis that enables observing the 
premium between and after different event windows to distinguish between 
behaviours suggested by different theories. For clarity, this thesis studies indices that 
are specific to Nordic stock markets.  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter two collects and comments on 
the general finance literature that has led to the emergence and popularity of the 
passive investing style. Chapter three focuses on passive investing and index 
premium by briefly explaining indices and index funds and builds the theoretical 
framework around the index premium specifically. Chapter four presents the data 
and methodology used in the empirical section of this thesis and chapter five presents 
the results. Chapter six concludes the thesis.  
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2 MARKET EFFICIENCY AND INVESTING 
2.1 Random Walk Theory and The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Random walk theory assumes that new information is efficiently priced into asset 
prices and that asset prices only convey information about past events. Thus, as news 
cannot be forecasted, the previous variation in asset prices cannot be used to predict 
future movements (Malkiel, 2003a).  
Building upon the random walk theory by Kendall (1953), the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH), first presented by Fama (1970), is of the cornerstone theories in 
modern finance. EMH states that as a pricing mechanism financial markets are 
efficient in reflecting all available information into asset prices correctly and thus 
neither technical or fundamental analysis can yield benefit for the individual 
investor. It is always reasonable to assume that all significant mispricing is already 
cleared by arbitrageurs and that prices are ‘correct’. The main conclusion from EMH 
is that rational investors shouldn’t spend resources for information and transactions 
to gain excess returns. 
The market efficiency is traditionally divided into three cases based on what 
information is reflected into asset prices. Weak form market efficiency stands for the 
case in which historical prices are reflected in asset prices. In semi-strong form, other 
public information such as on earnings announcements and stock splits are included. 
Finally, strong form considers that all relevant information, public or private, is 
reflected in asset prices (Fama, 1970). As an update to his original paper about 
efficient market hypothesis Fama (1991) modifies the division of different forms of 
market efficiency. The weak form now includes also general tests for return 
predictability, such as interest rates and dividend yields as well as cross-sectional 
return predictability. That is, the updated version of weakly efficient markets fully 
incorporates any predictive information that has already been disclosed to the public 
such as predictors derived from income statements, balance sheets, or general 
performance of assets. The names of semi-strong form and strong form efficiency are 
changed to event studies and tests for private information, but the content remains 
the same: event studies considers cases or events where relevant information is 
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disclosed and tests for private information considers whether private information 
affects asset prices. So far, these proposals have not in large scale replaced the 
framework of Fama (1970) in finance literature. 
The EMH assumes that transaction costs are non-existent, all relevant information is 
available and free for all market participants, and that all market participants share 
the views about information’s supposed effect on asset prices. While these conditions 
cannot be met in strict sense, Fama (1970) states that reasonable deviations from 
them has only a limited effect on market efficiency. 
Jensen (1978) formulates market efficiency as such that the prices reflect available 
information only to the extent at which marginal benefits of acting on other 
information do not exceed the marginal costs of doing so. This less strict formulation 
is economically more sensible than the original from 1970 (Fama, 1991). Malkiel 
(2003a) defines efficiency in a way that “…such markets do not allow investors to 
earn above-average returns without accepting above-average risks.” He continues 
that markets can be efficient even if they sometimes make mistakes, if many 
participants are irrational, or if volatility seems irrationally high as long as “true 
value will win in the end.”  
Fama (1970) underlines that the EMH poses a joint-hypothesis problem in which 
market efficiency must be tested against some asset-pricing model and thus the 
results are always subject to the quality of the pricing model. In fact, the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) on which the original Fama (1970) efficient market 
hypothesis was based on has proven to be a rather inaccurate model for pricing 
assets. Fama (1998) examines some notable works of ‘event study literature’ and 
using finds that while under and overreactions as well as continuation and reversal of 
abnormal returns generally appear just as common, they tend to disappear when 
methodology on determining abnormal returns is adjusted reasonably.  
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2.2 Forecasting and Market Efficiency 
Forecasting asset prices or returns are perhaps the most interesting topic in finance 
for practitioners and for most academics. Among the latter, there are varying views 
about whether forecasting is at all possible. According to widely accepted EMH it 
shouldn’t be but there is an extensive body of literature that claims otherwise and an 
entire school of behavioural finance that is based on the assumption that investors are 
not rational which is often, incorrectly, assumed to be a condition for EMH. There 
are two parts to this question: 1) Does EMH allow forecasting returns and 2) to what 
extent the market is at all efficient?  
2.2.1 Short- and Long-Term Forecasting 
In the 1970’s EMH dominated academia with little opposition (Fama, 1998). At that 
time a large body of empirical research had concluded that short term returns are 
impossible to forecast by finding that short term autocorrelation in stock returns is 
very close to zero and thus had ‘confirmed’ random walk theory and supported the 
EMH.  
The 1980’s saw and increase in academic papers claiming that while short term 
returns have consistently been shown to be impossible to forecast, long term stock 
returns could be forecasted for example with financial multiples such as dividend 
yield ratio (Shiller, 1980) or valuation metrics such as price to earnings (P/E) 
(Campbell and Shiller, 1988). Fama (1990) finds that proxies for expected return and 
expected return shocks explain 30% of NYSE value-weighted returns.  
According to Shiller (1980) prices deviate from their ‘correct’ prices given by asset 
pricing models by a factor of ~30. And converge to their ‘real’ value in the long 
term. Fama and French (1988) make similar findings by studying long term 
autocorrelations in stock prices and finding that aggregate dividend yields predict 
stock returns and that slowly decaying predictive component in price gains predictive 
power with a longer time frame. They conclude that this violates EMH or is due to 
variance in discount rates.   
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According to Malkiel (2003a) dividend yields are closely related to interest rates and 
thus dividend yield’s forecasting power may be due to the stock market adjusting to 
economic conditions. In defence of forecastability Cochrane (2008) turns the 
question around and states that observed variation in dividend yields must mean that 
either returns are forecastable from dividend yields or dividend growth must be 
forecastable from stocks prices and shows that there is no empirical support for the 
latter statement. 
According to Timmermann and Granger (2004) EMH doesn’t rule out all forms of 
predictability but only those that provide arbitrage opportunities. They show that 
time-varying risk-premia can be a source of forecastability and that forecasting 
models that predict conditional covariance of returns with stochastic discount factor 
do not violate EMH. Cochrane (2011) also shows that the price dividend ratio 
corresponds to discount rate variability and that discount rate variability is a crucial 
topic for asset pricing research.  
Hansen (1982) introduced Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and by rejecting 
previously untestable consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) that had 
been offered as a theoretical explanation for discount rate variability Hansen 
confirmed Shiller’s (1980) finding that stock prices deviate too much from values 
rational asset pricing models suggest even when time varying discount rate is 
considered. Timmermann and Granger (2004) continue that most economic models 
such as the CCAPM do not create enough variation in economic risk-premia. 
So far it seems that some forms on long term predictability have both empirical and 
theoretical support contrary to common misconception that forecasting is 
categorically impossible. The conclusion drawn from not finding short term 
autocorrelation in the ’ ’60s may have been overstated.  
2.2.2 Persistence of Forecastability 
EMH does not allow persistent arbitrage opportunities. According to EMH 
mispricings and phenomena providing opportunities for arbitrage should disappear 
due to arbitrageurs exploiting them to the extent that they lose economic 
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significance. Therefore, one would expect that such mispricings and phenomena are 
only temporary as eventually, enough traders discover them by themselves or by 
them being published. Persistent phenomena violate EMH or are subject to some 
factor that the asset pricing model being used to evaluate excess returns does not 
capture. Timmermann and Granger (2004) argue that it takes some time for market to 
learn new forecasting methods and thus the decay of forecasting power is slower than 
strict EMH would suggest.  
McLeod and Pontiff (2016) study 97 cross-sectional predictors of stock returns 
published in peer-reviewed academic journals and find an average of 32% decline in 
predicting power since publication. Since the decline signals that the predictability 
was in part due to mispricing arbitrageurs seem to utilize and crowd out such 
opportunities as suggested by EMH. Malkiel (2003a) also states that forecasting 
methods tend to lose power after they are published. 
2.2.3 Misconceptions About Forecastability and Efficiency 
In 2013 Eugene Fama, Lars Peter Hansen and Robert Shiller got a shared Nobel prize 
in economics for their work on different sides on asset pricing. Shiller and Fama are 
often considered to be in a grave disagreement regarding market efficiency and 
dividing the prize among them and Hansen who’s work allows bridging the gap 
between Shiller’s and Fama’s work and interpretations underlines how forecasting 
and market efficiency can actually work together. 
The EMH is based on the idea that informed market participants are financially 
incentivized to clear mispricings. Economically realistic interpretations of market 
efficiency such as Malkiel (2003a) do not deny occasional divergence from perfect 
efficiency equilibria but instead require occasional forecastability and arbitrage to 
bring prices to their ‘correct’ levels. However, as markets tend to be generally 
efficient, without other information, it is always reasonable to assume that any price 
is ‘correct’. 
It is not necessary for all or even most of the investors to be rational and informed for 
prices to converge to their ‘correct’ levels and this is most certainly not the case in 
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reality either. One might argue that given similar objectives as all trades have two 
opposite sides one must ‘lose’ and other must ‘win’. Realistically a rational investor 
cannot be certain whether he is the one who is right or the one who only thinks he’s 
right and uncertainty about future events further adds element of luck into the trade. 
Thus, it is impossible to know ex post whether the result was by chance. Strict 
proponents of EMH can always argue that even consistently successful traders and 
fund managers are only very lucky outliers and that their performance in unlikely to 
persist.  
A typical conclusion about market efficiency is thus that investors should always 
invest in passive strategies and minimize costs related to investing as they would be 
wasted. Although this view is increasingly adopted in investment community, 
especially among retail investors, it is an oversimplification that does not consider 
relevant issues such as risk aversion and investment horizon. 
While the conclusion that EMH denies all forms of return predictability on all time 
frames is incorrect it and an assumption that such EMH is an accurate description of 
reality has led to a great popularity of passive investment strategies, the answer to the 
question whether forecasting returns can be used to reliably earn higher returns in 
long run is not so obvious.  
2.3 Modern Portfolio Theory and Diversification 
Modern portfolio theory states that investors earn optimal risk adjusted returns by 
diversifying their investment into a portfolio that has the lowest possible covariance 
for given expected return. Diversification negates stock specific unsystematic risks 
and in aggregate only has systematic risk. Because unsystematic risk can be removed 
without cost it doesn’t account to risk premium and thus brings no reward for 
investor bearing it. Such efficient portfolios form an efficient frontier with regards to 
expected returns and portfolio covariance. A rational investor should allocate their 
investment between the efficient portfolio that has the highest expected return with 
regards to variance and a risk-free return yielding asset based on their risk tolerance 
(Markowitz 1952, Sharpe 1964). 
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Efficient frontiers and portfolios as in Markowitz (1952) as well as market portfolio 
m  (Sharpe, 1964; Litner, 1965) are theoretical concepts and as such inapplicable in 
investing. In classical Markowitz model portfolios of real assets are optimized based 
on their mean returns and variances in a way that gives higher weight for assets with 
high mean return relative to its variance. While the mean-variance-optimization is 
theoretically attractive, its’ usefulness in practice has been contested. According to 
Michaud (1989) the mean-variance-optimization overweighs and underweights assets 
of which’s metrics are more likely to be a result of an estimation error. DeMiguel, 
Garlappi, and Uppal (2007) compare the mean-variance model with 14 different 
methods for correcting estimation errors and find that none yield better results than 
naïve equally weighted portfolio.  
Typical industry assumption has been that most of the benefits from diversification 
can be achieved with roughly 20 stocks but according to Statman (2004) the optimal 
number of stocks implied by the mean-variance model has risen closer to 300. 
Managing such portfolio is obviously unreasonable for most investors and thus 
optimal diversification in practice requires investing in some sort of funds. 
2.4 Passive and Active Investing 
2.4.1 Passive Investing 
Passive investing is an investment strategy that aims to minimize costs related to 
transactions and information by holding assets for long periods of time disregarding 
their short-term price fluctuations. Passive investing aims to capture appreciation 
across asset classes and markets without spending resources on analysis. Thus, 
diversification is an integral part of passive investing strategies and large exposure to 
individual assets is not used to exploit possible mispricing even in the long term.  
Index investing (or indexing) is probably the most common way to utilize a passive 
investment strategy. Index investing refers to replicating a performance of an index 
or indices over the investment period, usually by holding passive funds such as 
ETFs.  
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Passive investing and indexing have been shown to outperform active investing after 
costs by numerous studies. According to Malkiel (2003b) this is due to active 
investing being a zero-sum game where positive excess returns of one investor are 
offset by negative excess returns of another. Thus, on average the expected return 
from active investing is the ‘market return’ minus costs related to transactions and 
information while passive investing earns just the market return.  
Simple passive investing strategies yield profit only when the entire market or the 
segment of the market tracked by the index rises. While on a very long time this is 
both expected and observed, lengthy bear markets can significantly impact passive 
investments performance even on long time frames. The rise of passive investment as 
an investment style and as an industry since the 1970’s has coincided with the U.S. 
being in a constant uptrend except for roughly a decade following the dotcom 
bubble. Even though the simple logic of passive investments outperformance holds 
in bear markets as well, most of the empirical evidence in favour of passive investing 
is from a period which arguably has been exceptionally good for this style of 
investing.  
Investors should bear in mind that diversification is the only true free lunch in 
investing and that passive investing and indexing are simply investing styles among 
others, although arguably among the best of them. While passive investing typically 
includes extreme diversification among assets, it bears heavy exposure to market risk 
or more specific factors captured by the index. Proponents of passive investing tend 
to argue that stock returns cannot be reliably forecasted. This is true only in the short 
term and thus passive investing for long term misses out on returns from forecasting.  
2.4.2 Active Investing 
Active investing is a high-level term for strategies and investment styles where 
investors aim to exploit profitable conditions by their selection of assets and timing 
of their purchases based on specific conditions. The main difference between active 
and passive investing is that active investors try to earn excess return by outsmarting 
the market.  
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Typical ways to engage in active investing are investing directly into assets and 
managing one’s portfolio independently or by investing in actively managed funds 
such as mutual funds or hedge funds. Actively managed funds typically charge 
higher management fees than passive funds and their performance against passive 
funds on aggregate does not appear to justify such higher fees.  
Active investing allows investors to utilize fluctuations from correct prices and to 
form strategies that better suit their investing horizons and risk-aversion. Active 
strategies allow for investors to benefit from various kinds of market conditions and 
for flexible risk management. Using knowledge and judgement in specific 
investment decisions may be especially beneficial compared to passive investing in 
markets and niche industries that are subject to risks related to legislation, civil 
unrest, or commonality of general untrustworthiness and bad practices in an industry.  
2.4.3 Smart Beta 
Smart beta refers to investing that aims to gain exposure to specific risk factors rather 
than to entire market risk or to exploit opportunities in individual assets. Smart beta 
investments capture risk factors by systematically using predetermined rules to 
manage assets instead of traditional active management. Management fees for smart 
beta ETFs typically range between those of active and passive funds.   
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3 INDICES AND INDEX PREMIUM 
3.1 Stock Indices 
Stock indices are portfolios of assets constructed to represent the average 
performance of a market or a segment of a market. Within the finance context many 
different kinds of indicators (such as CBOE Volatility Index, VIX) are called indices, 
but here index refers strictly to a stock index. Typically, indices have an arbitrary 
base value which then changes based on the weighted arithmetic mean of returns of 
stocks in the index. The performance of an index is thus presented by the relative 
changes in the index’s value while the value itself is useless information.  
According to Lo (2016) indices have at least two main functions: provide aggregate 
information about the performance of the economy without focusing on individual 
assets and serve as a benchmark for active investors. To serve as a benchmark, the 
index needs to be investable and formed systematically based on public information 
and rules. Investability requires that the assets included in the index are liquid 
enough so that an investor is able to replicate the index as an investment portfolio for 
a short time and during which gain the same return as the index.  
The universe of possible assets and the criteria by which the assets are selected 
depends on the purpose of each individual index. Rather than trying to definitively 
categorize indices, it is perhaps more sensible to think about them via possible 
screening criteria. For example, an index could ‘invest’ globally or screen by region, 
country, or by their characteristics while at the same time screening by for example 
company size, industry, or by accounting metrics. The most commonly followed 
indices are so called ‘blue chip’ indices that usually include a number of the most 
traded stocks in a market that makes the index capture reasonably high portion of 
free-floating stocks within that market without sacrificing liquidity.  
There are plenty of ways to determine the weights of stocks in an index with the 
most common ones being price-weighted (stocks with higher nominal value have 
higher weight), capitalization-weighted (weights based on the market value of the 
companies), and equal-weighted (each stock’s performance has equal effect 
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regardless of nominal price or market cap), capitalization-weighted being to the most 
common. Weighing based on capitalization is arguably the most representative for 
entire markets as stock market in aggregate is capitalization weighted as well. 
However, as capitalization-weighting emphasizes performance of large stocks which 
in general tend to have lower returns compared to smaller stocks, capitalization-
weighted indices may not work as well as a benchmark for all investing strategies.  
Indices are rebalanced and modified from time to time to keep the index 
representative of the market or a segment of a market. Typically, indices are 
rebalanced periodically such as annually (e.g. FTSE Russel indices), semi-annually 
(e.g. FTSE, and OMX indices), or even quarterly (MSCI), but some indices are 
reviewed at random times based on the judgement of the provider (e.g. S&P 500). 
3.2 Index Funds 
3.2.1 Indexing 
Index funds are mutual funds and ETFs that aim to replicate the performance of 
some index. Instead of trying to enhance risk-adjusted or absolute returns, the main 
goal of index fund management is to replicate the chosen index as closely as possible 
and to reduce their tracking error. Funds may achieve the replication either by 
physically investing in the underlying assets of an index (physical fund) or by using 
derivatives contracts, mainly swaps (synthetic funds). Synthetic indexing makes it 
easier to exactly replicate the performance of indices regardless of their liquidity, but 
using derivatives results in synthetic indexers bearing a counterparty risk and being 
subject to stricter regulation, compared to physical indexers. Physical replication can 
be achieved by owning all stocks in an index (full replication), but as with large 
indices full replication can be impractical, some funds aim to replicate the index by 
owning only a portion of stocks included in the index (sampling).  
3.2.2 Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds are a traditional form of funds where a group of investors essentially 
pool their capital together to a fund that is managed by professional money manager. 
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Investors are entitled to the capital in the fund in proportion to fund shares they own. 
Fund’s total net asset value (NAV) and thus the value of each share is calculated at 
the end of each trading day. Typically, open-ended mutual funds allow investors to 
buy or redeem shares once a day at a pre-determined cut-off time based on last day’s 
NAV. As each day open-ended mutual funds must transfer cash back and forth 
between themselves and investors, in order to avoid forced excess trading mutual 
funds hold a portion of their capital as cash diminishing potential return. 
According to Gastineau (2004) index mutual funds tend to outperform ETFs 
following the same indices due to mutual fund managers being aggressive in efforts 
to recapture transaction costs related to index revisions. Index mutual funds take 
advantage of the time between index composition change announcement and 
effective date by shifting their portfolios toward the structure of the new index before 
the effective date enhancing their return. 
3.2.3 ETFs 
ETFs are relatively new investment vehicle, introduced in the 1990s in the U.S. and 
in the 2000’s in Europe. The key difference between traditional mutual funds and 
shares of ETFs are traded on exchanges like stocks while mutual funds interact with 
investors typically once a day. To achieve this liquidity ETFs are structured different 
to mutual funds. ETFs are created and operated by a process of creation and 
redemption. Each day the fund (sponsor) posts the structure of the portfolio it tries to 
achieve. Authorized participants, namely some large financial institutions, then buy 
the securities needed to form a large portfolio with such structure from the open 
market. Authorized participant exchanges this ‘creation unit’ with the sponsor for 
ETF shares worth the same as the securities in the creation unit and sells the shares 
on open market. If investors bid up the ETF share price relative to the value of the 
underlying securities, authorized participant can repeat this process of creation by 
buying more of the securities bidding up their price, exchanging them for a new 
creation unit of ETF shares, and selling the new ETF shares on open market bringing 
their price down. Similarly, if the ETF shares trade at a discount to the underlying 
securities, authorized participant can engage in opposite process called ‘redemption’. 
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Thus, the authorized participants ensure that the ETFs price does not deviate much 
from the value of its underlying securities by arbitrage.  
As the sponsor needs to do very little to manage its portfolio, the management fees of 
ETFs are typically very low compared to mutual funds. ETFs are also typically 
treated as stocks in taxation. These qualities have made ETFs as an attractive long-
term investments.  
3.2.4 Closet Indexing 
Closet indexing is a questionable practice in which active managers secretly replicate 
their benchmark index in order to not fall below it. Varying levels of the active 
portfolio can be indexed and while combining active and passive management might 
be appropriate as a general investing strategy, any level of shadow indexing is 
problematic because as a result the manager charges active fees for passive 
management without the investor knowing about it. The exact amount of closet 
indexed capital is unknown, but it is reasonable to assume that at least a small 
portion of capital reportedly under active management is in fact indexed.  
3.2.5 Tracking Error 
According to Frino, Gallagher, and Neubert (2004) tracking error consists of 
endogenous component caused by imperfection in open-end index fund’s replication 
strategy and of exogenous component caused by changes in the underlying index. 
Both components are due to index funds being subject to market frictions while the 
indices they are trying to replicate are essentially mathematical calculations without 
restrictions imposed by real markets. They find that index revisions are a significant 
driver of tracking error in passive funds.  
3.2.6 Index Revision Replication Strategies 
For an ETF the simplest and the most common strategy to adjust its portfolio to a 
change in the index is to simply post new creation/redemption baskets on the day the 
index change comes into effect and let the authorized participants announce whether 
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they plan to create or redeem at the end of the trading day, creating uncertainty about 
whether additional trading is required to match the new index. This procedure leads 
the fund to replicate the index with an exogenous component in tracking error that 
matches the fund’s expense ratio. While there is evidence that modifying the 
portfolio and creation/redemption baskets before the official implementation of new 
index would be beneficial, ETF portfolio managers are reluctant to engage more 
sophisticated strategies implemented by mutual fund managers due to differences in 
regulations between the two fund types (Gasteneau, 2004).  
Simply updating creation and redemption baskets does not however rebalance the 
ETF’s portfolio. Creation and redemption processes do not ‘clear out’ the excluded 
stocks and without the correct amount of included stocks in the portfolio, redemption 
would not be possible. According to finance expert Martin Paasi (2020) ETF’s 
rebalance their portfolios manually or with the market maker which for example 
commits on performing the trades with closing prices.  
Fundamentally ETFs’ cost efficiency stems from the fact that ETFs operate in a way 
in which other market participants take care of transactions in the market and ETFs 
engage with authorized participants only by predetermined rules.  
3.2.7 Criticism on Indexing 
Indexing and passive investing in general raise a lot of criticism and mixed feelings 
among academics and practitioners. While the motivation for passive investing can 
be seen as an insult to active investors’ trade, passive investing relies on active 
investors in terms of price discovery and market efficiency. While there is little 
evidence that passive investing is yet dominant enough to significantly adversely 
impact price discovery, it has some economic effects that can be expected to increase 
in magnitude as passive investing continues to become ever more popular.  
According to Wurgler (2010), indexing increases correlation in stock prices in the 
index with among each other and the index price due to fund inflows and outflows 
affecting included stocks, an effect which he calls ‘detachment’. This causes the 
prices of stocks in index to behave differently to the prices of similar stocks excluded 
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from the index and the stocks in the index to deviate from their ‘correct’ prices due 
to being in an index. Further he argues that detachment makes the index less 
representative of the market which violates what was the motivation for index 
investing in the first place.  
Brown, Davies, and Ringgenberg (2019) find that ETF fund flows distort stock 
prices due to non-fundamental demand and that shorting high flow ETFs while going 
long in low flow ETFs earns 1% - 4% monthly excess return. They also find that 
fund flows lead ETFs to systematically mistime their investments which leads to 
underperformance. Cha and Lee (2001) find that equity mutual fund flows are driven 
by market performance and that equity mutual fund flows do not appear to influence 
market performance.  
Morck and Yang (2001) speculate on the possibility of an “indexing bubble” where 
increasing fund flows enhance the performance of indexing and therefore attract even 
more fund flows. According to Wurgler (2010) this mechanism makes indexing 
represent a momentum strategy. 
John Bogle (2018), pioneer in index fund industry, warned that increasing popularity 
of index investing would eventually lead to index fund companies owning over 50% 
of the U.S. stocks with BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard together owning over 
30%.  
3.3 The Index Premium 
Index premium is premium in the price of a stock that is included in an index. 
Although the literature uses varying names for this phenomenon, e.g. ‘Index 
inclusion effect’ (or ‘S&P500 effect’ in studies focusing on said index), the meaning 
of this phenomenon in simple and uniform in the literature. This study uses the term 
‘index premium’ as it best describes the phenomenon, a price premium caused by 
membership in an index. Other than that, the definition is intentionally left vague in 
order to capture the whole phenomenon and its behaviour.  
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Historically the theories explaining the index premium were price pressure 
hypothesis, imperfect substitutes hypothesis and information hypothesis but since 
price pressure and imperfect substitutes are essentially the same hypothesis about 
downward sloping demand curves and excess demand, with slightly different 
assumptions, it is simpler to consider them in a category of demand-based theories. 
Also, as information hypothesis consists of a plethora of different hypotheses, it 
should be considered as a category instead of a single hypothesis.  
Demand based theories focus on the effect of excess demand and supply caused by 
passive investors rebalancing their portfolios around index composition changes. 
They assume a downward sloping demand curve for stocks and differ in terms of 
rationale for it, resulting in different conclusions about the timeframe at which the 
demand curves slope down (long-term vs short-term) and thus different assumptions 
about the duration or persistence of the price premium. Demand based theories 
assume the index premium to be a mispricing contradicting with semi-strong form of 
market efficiency.  
Information based theories explain the index premium by information and signals the 
index membership relays about the company. While there is numerous information-
based theories, they are similar in that they assume that the market doesn’t utilize 
public information efficiently and that index inclusion confirms, highlights, or 
refines information for investors. From this point of view price with the premium is 
the ‘correct’ one while without the premium, it would be at a discount.  
In October 1989 Standard & Poor’s began announcing index revisions about week 
one in advance to the date the change came into effect. Studies using earlier data 
from the S&P500 are thus more subject to a situation where the information shock 
and mechanical demand shocks from passive investors happen simultaneously. 
Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) find that after this date the S&P 500 inclusion 
announcement is followed by positive abnormal returns and the actual inclusion is 
followed by negative abnormal returns (vice versa for deletions) while studies using 
data before this date find significant abnormal returns on the announcement date and 
vary on their findings about reversals. The now common practice of announcing 
index composition changes beforehand separates the information event from the 
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mechanical excess demand from passive investors and to some extent allow for 
testing demand and information-based theories separately.  
3.3.1 Demand-based Theories 
The price pressure hypothesis, first introduced by Scholes (1972), assumes that 
stocks have a short term downward sloping demand curve. Due to the downward 
sloping demand curve an extra supply in a stock due to secondary equity distribution 
causes a discount or a “sweetener” in the stock price to induce the market 
participants to buy them. Scholes (1972) examines the price impact of secondary 
distributions but finds that while stocks have a high price elasticity, the price 
movement related to such events is caused by the information they include. 
Mikkelson and Partch (1985) find that the magnitude of price impact caused by 
secondary offerings is related to the size of the offering, large offering causing large 
impacts, but also conclude that the effect is due information revealed by the offering. 
In his pioneering work regarding index premium Shleifer (1986) examined the price 
impact of S&P 500 revisions to find whether the excess demand from passive 
investors provided evidence for downward sloping demand curves and concludes 
that the strong and persistent price effect from index revisions supports the 
hypothesis of downward sloping demand curves.  
Based on the substitution hypothesis which states that demand curves for stocks are 
flat due to stocks having substitute stocks with similar characteristics (Scholes, 1972) 
Harris and Gurel (1986) introduce its reversal, the imperfect substitutes hypothesis, 
and the notion of short term and long term downward sloping demand curves. The 
imperfect substitutes hypothesis assumes that due to stocks not having close 
substitutes, the demand curves slope down in the long term and therefore demand 
shocks cause the demand curve to shift and form a new equilibrium price instead of 
causing only temporary price shock. Shleifer (1986) results in fact seem to 
specifically support long-term downward sloping demand curves even though he 
doesn’t make that distinction. 
Using S&P 500 data from 1976 to 1989 Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) find that 
individual stocks in fact rarely have close substitutes, that the stocks that have close 
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substitutes also have flatter demand curves, and that idiosyncratic risk (arbitrage risk) 
may explain the downward sloping demand curves. On more recent data from S&P 
500 and Russell 2000, Petajisto (2011) also estimates that idiosyncratic risk has an 
economically significant effect on abnormal price activity around index composition 
changes. Petajisto (2009) however argues that limits to arbitrage does not fully cover 
the magnitude of index premium.  
In Harris and Gurel (1986) formulation the price pressure hypothesis assumes only a 
short term downward sloping demand curve, due to suppliers of liquidity requiring a 
compensation, and perfect price elasticity of demand in the long term and thus 
violates the EMH only in short term. This translates to demand shocks causing only 
temporary price shocks and thus the price pressure hypothesis is supported by 
evidence in which a price reversal is observed and conversely the imperfect 
substitutes hypothesis is supported when reversal is not observed.  
Chakrabarti, Huang, Jayaraman, and Lee (2004) study changes in MSCI country 
indices significant positive excess returns as well as excess volumes for the periods 
between inclusion announcement and effective date, supporting downward sloping 
demand curves. They also find support for liquidity hypothesis and price-pressure 
hypothesis in Japan and UK.  
Biktimirov (2004) studies a mechanical conversion of TIPs 35 and TIPs 100 funds 
into a new i60 Fund in March 6, 2000 where 40 stocks from TIPs 100 were excluded 
and finds permanent stock price decline and increased trading volume, supporting 
downward sloping demand curves. Kaul, Mehrotra and Morck (2000) study the 
methodology changes based mechanical rebalancing of TSE 300 index in 1996, 
which was purely information free event, and find price shocks relative to changes in 
index weighting that do not revert in short term.  
Dhillon and Johnson (1991) study index inclusions in options markets and find that 
call options of included stocks increase on the announcement date signalling that the 
market assumes the price change in the underlying to persists until the maturity of 
the contract, supporting long term downward sloping demand curves, but also 
information-based theories. They also find that the price of corresponding put 
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options doesn’t rise, signalling that the options price changes are not solely due to 
volatility.  
As a contrast to most studies which focus on events, Cha and Lee (2001) examine 
continuous equity mutual fund flows and find no support for price pressure 
hypothesis or downward sloping demand curves in general.  
3.3.2 Information-based Theories 
According to Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) excess return related to index 
revisions does not necessarily violate near perfect elasticity of demand curves for 
stocks if they are due to changes in expected future cash flow or to changes in 
discount rate for the stock. These are the core of information-based theories for index 
premium.  
Information hypothesis is based on the idea that stock’s inclusion to an index is a 
signal about the firm being industry leader or having competent management (Jain, 
1987), or in other words of, of being high quality. Therefore, companies that are 
included in indices are expected to perform well in the future. Similarly, the 
exclusion can be seen as a signal that the company has deteriorated relative to its 
peers and is unlikely to reverse in short term. Because indices typically include a 
fixed number of companies, they are evaluated relative to each other. Therefore, 
according to information hypothesis, inclusion signals that the company is of high 
quality relative to other candidates and thus of high quality in absolute terms as well. 
While exclusion may be due to degradation in company’s fundamentals, it may also 
be due improvement in other companies’ fundamentals. Once company’s ‘top status’ 
has been confirmed by inclusion in an index that takes fundamentals into account it 
shouldn’t then quickly disappear only due to exclusion and therefore information 
hypothesis doesn’t support full reversal of index premium at exclusion.  
According to Kaul, Mehrotra and Morck (2000) as Standard and Poors’ states about 
S&P 500 that “to keep the Index representative and updated, but always within the 
context of the basic principal [sic] of stability of composition, and every effort is 
made to avoid excessive turnover.” Inclusion in S&P 500 may signal that Standard 
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and Poor’s, a rating company, considers included company to be in good financial 
condition and expects it to remain so. This underlines the point of view that even if 
index revisions are based on public information, index inclusions may reduce the 
asymmetry of conclusions about it. According to Chen, et al. (2004) inclusion in 
S&P 500 may help a company to raise additional capital to grow the company. This 
should also lead to reduction in cost of capital and thus increase profits.  
According to the liquidity hypothesis, stocks inclusion to an index increases its’ 
liquidity and thus its price. The increased liquidity also attracts analysts to process 
information about the firm which decreases information asymmetry and thus further 
increases liquidity and price due to decline in spread (Chung, McInish, Wood & 
Wyhowski, 1995). Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) argue that since passive 
investors do not engage in trading outside index revisions, index inclusion in fact 
reduces stock’s liquidity. On the other hand, membership in an index may increase 
trustworthiness and investability of a stock for institutions and foreign investors, 
therefore increasing the liquidity in the remaining free float. 
Following Merton (1987) the investor awareness hypothesis assumes that investors 
are more likely to be aware of companies included in indices. Increased investor 
awareness incentivises management to deliver better results. Because investor 
awareness is unlikely to diminish rapidly when a company is removed from an index, 
investor awareness hypothesis offers one possible explanation for a large number of 
empirical studies finding that the negative price effect of index exclusion is smaller 
in magnitude than the positive price effect from index inclusions and not permanent 
(Denis, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov, and Yu, 2003). Further, the possible decline in 
company’s fundamentals is more likely noticed faster and priced in if the company is 
more thoroughly scrutinized by analysts and investors reducing the magnitude of 
eventual deletion announcement.  
3.3.3 Transparency of Index Changes 
Rating agencies and other companies maintaining indices use varying methodologies 
and criteria as a base for their decisions about index composition. While they use 
varying selection criteria in terms of financial metrics, they also differ in terms of 
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candidate pools, revision schedules and whether they disclose these facts, or in other 
words in terms of revision transparency. Standard and Poor’s and thus S&P 500 
index is notorious for the lack of transparency as they do not disclose the candidate 
pool, exact selection criteria and they do not publish a predetermined schedule for 
revisions. As contrast, FTSE 100 index for example is composed quarterly from 
publicly disclosed pool of candidate companies based on their market cap and thus 
the transparency is very high.  
If index composition is based on public information and public criteria, 
announcements of composition are essentially an easily forecastable formality which 
do not signal new information. The market should be able to incorporate the 
composition change into the price of affected stocks on a longer term beforehand 
instead of reacting rapidly to the announcement. Therefore, we should expect more 
significant abnormal price action around announcements in indices that have lower 
transparency and thus have an element of surprise in the announcement.  
Contrary to this logic Chen (2006) and Gastineau (2002) assume that the index 
premium is due to arbitrageurs bidding the price up before indexers rebalance their 
portfolios and thus suggest that transparency of selection criteria in fact increases 
index premium. This view is somewhat puzzling from EMH point of view as it does 
not only assume that market is inefficient at incorporating information but also that it 
actively misprices assets when relevant information is revealed.  
Petajisto (2011) finds that stocks added to Russell 2000 experienced on average 4.7% 
positive price impact from announcement to effective day while stocks deleted 
experienced average 4.6% negative price impact during 1990-2005. Russell 2000 is a 
market weighted stock index with fully transparent market cap-based selection 
criteria and therefore changes in its composition are highly predictable and free of 
information.  
If the composition changes are known in advance, one could expect arbitrageurs 
front running indexers and each other to bid up the price before the announcement. 
This would smooth out the price increase over a longer period of time making it 
difficult to distinguish.  
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Most studies regarding index premium focus on S&P 500 and often even discuss 
about “S&P 500 effect” or something similar instead of index premium in general. 
However, when it comes to methodology S&P 500 differs from the mainstream to 
the extent that it is reasonable to assume it influencing how market reacts to revisions 
in it. From this perspective, studies which focus on more transparent indices become 
an important tool for evaluating theories explaining the index premium.  
3.3.4 Level of Indexing 
As there is strong empirical evidence for downward sloping demand curves and the 
debate focuses primarily on the reversal of price shocks caused by the excess demand 
from index tracking investors, the amount and proportion of capital following the 
index should have a direct effect the magnitude of the corresponding index premium. 
Morck and Yang (2001) find that the magnitude of the S&P 500 index premium rose 
along the increasing popularity of passive investing from 1987 to 1997. Similarly, 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) find that the growth on the S&P 500 tracking 
capital rose from about 3% to over 8% of the total capitalization of the S&P 500 
index during 1976-1996. Further, Petajisto (2011) finds that the index premium in 
the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 grew along with the popularity of indexing until 2000 
but has declined since 2005. 
The extent to which increase in the magnitude of index premium along with the 
portion of capitalization under passive investors’ management during the last 
decades of the 20
th
 century has a causal relationship as demand-based theories 
suggest is not easily testable.  
Because passive investors do not engage in trading, level of indexing also affects 
liquidity adversely by reducing free float (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002) and thus 
the effect proposed by liquidity hypothesis.  
3.3.5 Persistence of the Index Premium Phenomenon 
If limits to arbitrage does not cover the entire index premium phenomenon, 
according to EMH such abnormality should decline or disappear due to arbitrageurs 
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making the market more efficient. Many of the information-based theories also imply 
that advancement and utilization of information and communication technology in 
finance industry could have a diminishing effect on index premium.  
Petajisto (2011) finds that the magnitude of abnormal price action around the 
S&P500 and Russel 2000 changes rose from 1990 to 2000 but has declined since and 
speculates that the increased price effect of index changes may have attracted 
arbitrageurs and made the market more efficient.  
Synthetic indexing utilizes a mechanism for replicating the index that does not 
directly affect the demand for the underlying securities in an index. Emergence of 
synthetic indexing could thus have a diminishing effect on index premium in markets 
where synthetic indexing is popular.  
Kamal, Lawrence, McCabe, and Prakash (2012) argue that information asymmetry 
may have declined in recent years and find that the magnitude of abnormal price 
action and excess liquidity around index revisions has declined since 2000, 
supporting this claim.  
3.4 Index Turnover Cost 
According to Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) announcing index composition changes 
before their implementation allows stocks to enter indices at already inflated prices 
and to exit them at deflated prices. Index funds benefit from this as their goal is to 
minimize the ‘tracking error’ regardless of returns but this results in a reduction in 
return of the index itself causing a hidden cost for investors who follow the index by 
investing in tracking error minimizing funds.  
Index turnover cost is the reoccurring cost index funds (and the index itself) bear 
when a stock enters the index with index premium but exits with the price premium 
already discounted relative to an index-neutral strategy (Petajisto, 2011).  
While index turnover cost can be estimated by comparing index returns to similar 
index-neutral strategy, Petajisto (2011) also provides a cleaner way of calculating 
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index turnover costs for the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 indices. Index turnover cost 
for the S&P500 without price reversal is given by 
 𝑝[𝑠(𝑎 − 𝑑) + 𝑑]
1 + 𝑝
 
(1) 
 and with reversal by  
 
𝑝 (
𝑎 + 𝑑
1 + 𝑝
). 
(2) 
Where p is the price premium, s is the share of stocks held by index-neutral fund, a is 
the share of market value of the index for stocks added throughout the year, and d is 
the share of market value of the index for stocks deleted.  
According to Petajisto (2011), as Russell 2000 is rebalanced annually and 
transparently, its’ index turnover cost can be estimated by comparing its’ returns to 
that of a portfolio that is constructed using the same methodology but six months off 
cycle. As a result, Russell 2000 cash flow is given by 
 𝑑(1 − 𝑝) + 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑎 − 𝑎𝑡 (3) 
where d and 𝑑𝑡 are the “index value” of deletions due to falling below lower cutoff 
and rising above higher cutoff and a and 𝑎𝑡 are the index value of additions from 
rising above lower cutoff and falling below higher cut-off.  
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Assuming that would be inclusions and deletions in Russell 2000 are evenly 
distributed across the year, cash flow from off-phase index-neutral portfolio is given 
by 
 1
2
[𝑑(1 − 𝑝) + 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑎 − 𝑎𝑡] +
1
2
[𝑑 + 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑎(1 − 𝑝) − 𝑎𝑡], 
(4) 
and the difference of the two and hence the turnover cost without reversal by 
 𝑝
2
(𝑎 + 𝑑) (5) 
 and with reversal by  
 𝑝(𝑎 + 𝑑) (6) 
Using similar assumptions about the distribution of would be events, the formula in 
Eq. 4 can be used as is for estimating index turnover cost in semi-annually and 
quarterly reviewed indices with upper and lower cut-offs as well.  
Deriving from Russel 2000 index turnover cost as in Petajisto (2011) the index 
turnover cost for transparent and mechanical index with only lower bound without 
reversal is given by 
 1
2
[𝑑(1 − 𝑝) − 𝑎] +
1
2
[𝑑 − 𝑎(1 − 𝑝)] − 𝑑(1 − 𝑝) − 𝑎 =  
𝑎𝑝 + 𝑑𝑝
2
 
(7) 
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 and with reversal by  
 𝑎𝑝 + 𝑑𝑝. (8) 
 
Chen et al. (2006) assumes that the price impact of Russell 2000 composition 
changes is due to arbitrageurs and argues that index tracking investors would benefit 
from less transparency in the selection process. According to Pejatisto (2011), 
turnover cost in Russell 2000 is significantly larger than in the S&P 500 but assumes 
that this difference is due to mechanical indexers and to the fact that Russell 2000 is 
a small cap index. 
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4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data 
4.1.1 Indices and Events 
This study incorporates events from Nordic blue-chip indices from OMX, Oslo Bors, 
MSCI, and FTSE as well as FTSE Nordic 30 index and MSCI Nordic countries small 
cap indices. The events are recorded manually from index review announcements 
available at research.ftserussell.com, nasdaqomxnordic.com, oslobors.no, and 
msci.com and from data provided by MSCI
1
.  
Altogether there are 819 events out of which 448 are inclusions and 372 are 
exclusions ranging from February 2008 to March 2020. Distribution of events across 
indices and countries is presented at table 1. Amount of distinct companies in the 
sample is 357 with 286 for inclusions and 242 for exclusions.  
MSCI Nordic Large and Mid Cap Indices consist of 10 to 32 and capture 85% of the 
free float of each market while MSCI Nordic Small Cap Indexes consist of roughly 
100 to 200 small cap stocks and account for 14% of each country’s free float. 
Combined Small Cap and Large and Mid Cap Indices make up for MSCI Investable 
Market Index for each country. Together MSCI Nordic Large Cap Indices make up 
for the MSCI Nordic Countries composite index. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The MSCI data contained herein is the property of MSCI Inc.(MSCI). MSCI, its affiliates and its 
information providers make no warranties with respect to any such data. The MSCI data contained 
herein is used under license and may not be further used, distributed or disseminated without the 
express written consent of MSCI.  
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Table 1 Distribution of Events Across Countries and Indices 
 
Total Finland Sweden Denmark Norway Iceland 
Index + - + - + - + - + - + - 
Total 448 372 52 55 141 90 77 70 157 140 21 17 
OMXH25 10 5 10 5 
        OMXS30 4 4 
  
4 4 
      OMXC20 26 23 
    
26 23 
    OMXI10 21 17 
        
21 17 
OBX 41 36 
      
41 36 
  MSCI 
Finland 0 6 0 6 
        MSCI 
Sweden 11 11 
  
11 11 
      MSCI 
Denmark 10 8 
    
10 8 
    MSCI 
Norway 7 10 
      
7 10 
  MSCI 
Finland 
Small Cap 17 19 17 19 
        MSCI 
Sweden 
Small Cap 111 59 
  
111 59 
      MSCI 
Denmark 
Small Cap 21 23 
    
21 23 
    MSCI 
Norway 
Small Cap 78 59 
      
78 59 
  FTSE 
Finland 25 23 22 23 22 
        FTSE 
Sweden 30 11 13 
  
11 13 
      FTSE 
Denmark 20 14 12 
    
14 12 
    FTSE 
Norway 30 30 32 
      
30 32 
  FTSE 
Nordic 30 13 13 2 3 4 3 6 4 1 3     
MSCI Nordic Large and Mid Cap Indices consist of 10 to 32 and capture 85% of the 
free float of each market while MSCI Nordic Small Cap Indexes consist of roughly 
100 to 200 small cap stocks and account for 14% of each country’s free float. 
Combined Small Cap and Large and Mid Cap Indices make up for MSCI Investable 
Market Index for each country. Together MSCI Nordic Large Cap Indices make up 
for the MSCI Nordic Countries composite index. MSCI Indices are reviewed 
quarterly. Both the MSCI Nordic Index as well as each MSCI Investable Market 
Indices are followed by at least ETF’s from Xtrackers and iShares but the extent to 
which individual MSCI Nordic Country Indices are followed by passive remains 
unclear. As a company crosses the upper boundary of Small Cap Index from below 
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(above) it enters (exits) the MSCI Nordic Countries index but remains in the MSCI 
Investable Market Index. Therefore, inclusions and exclusions in which a stock 
crosses the upper boundary of a Small Cap Index are expected to have an effect 
inverse to events where stock crosses the lower bound. To correct for this, all such 
events are removed from Small Cap Indices but left in the Large Cap Indices. As a 
result, 29 inclusions and 20 exclusions are removed from MSCI Small Cap Indices 
leaving only 198 inclusions and 140 exclusions that cross the lower bound.  
OMX indices as well as Oslo Børs’s OBX are reviewed semi-annually on the last 
trading days of October and April and the changes are implemented on the first 
trading days of December and June. They consist of the most liquid stocks in each 
exchange measured by average trading volume over time. Thus, it is relatively easy 
to forecast inclusions and exclusions before the announcements with increasing 
confidence as announcement date comes closer. In OMX indices the price of the 
trading day previous to the date of implementation is used as basis for rebalancing. 
As a result, possibly inflated price at the day before implementation would decrease 
stock’s weight in the index and thus the non-fundamental demand from passive 
investors. Assuming an index premium of some percentages at most, such reduction 
in the demand is unlikely to be significant. OMXC20 and OMXS30 all followed by 
at least one ETF’s from Xact while OBX is followed by at least one ETF from Xact 
and one ETF from DNB. OMXH 25 is followed by at least one ETF from Seligson & 
Co.  
Semi-annually reviewed FTSE Nordic Index Series consists of FTSE Nordic 30, 
Demark 20, Finland 25, and Sweden 30 indices and include the most liquid stocks of 
each market. FTSE Norway 30 has not been updated since 2017 and has been 
removed from the series. FTSE Norway 30 was followed by a Global X ETF until 
2014 when it changed its target index to MSCI Norway IMI 25/50. FTSE Nordic 30 
index is currently tracked by at least one Global X ETF.  
4.1.2 Stock Returns 
Price data for the stocks and OMX Nordic 120 and Nordic 40 indices are collected 
from investing.com. Events involving stocks of which’s price data is unavailable or 
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which’s correct ISIN number cannot be determined are dropped. After dropping such 
events 400 inclusions and 323 exclusions remain.  
This study uses daily closing prices for daily return calculation. Missing values in 
price data are dealt with by replacing corresponding missing values in stock returns 
with zeros. This is a statistically conservative method for dealing with random 
missing values arising from technical errors, exchanges being closed on holidays, or 
lack of trades in illiquid stocks and does not require further procedures as the quality 
of investing.com’s data is generally reasonable. In addition to random missing values 
in the data, the data has an unfortunately high number of stocks that have long 
periods of price data missing. In cases where an event happens on such period the 
imputed zeros cause the entire event period cumulative abnormal returns to be zero. 
Such cases are dropped automatically at the end of each test while aggregating the 
results. The final number of events with corresponding price data for each test are 
presented in their statistics.  
4.2 Event Study 
An event study is a methodology for statistical testing of the effects of some events 
on asset prices or other metrics and was first developed by Fama, Fischer, Jensen and 
Roll (1969). Event studies typically use some statistical or economic model to 
estimate expected returns of assets and derive abnormal returns based on the 
difference of expected and observed returns. By excluding the event from estimation 
period, its’ possible effect on asset prices should be observable from the abnormal 
returns around the time of the event. To achieve statistical power, event studies event 
studies pool together multiple assets that have experienced a similar event and 
aggregate the abnormal returns relative to the time of the events. Cumulative mean 
abnormal returns are then used to examine the effect of the event. Because event 
studies generally examine the impact of an event only on a short timeframe, their 
results are not as sensitive to the quality of the model used. 
While the body of empirical literature in finance and economics using event studies 
is large and wide ranging, in finance typical use case for an event study is 
examination of markets response and assimilation of new information. This relates to 
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EMH in a sense that semi-strong form of efficiency or event study as Fama (1991) 
prefers it, suggests that all public information should be perfectly incorporated into 
prices by the market and events where private information is made public prices 
should jump into their ‘correct’ levels immediately. Thus, a strict interpretation of 
EMH suggests that event studies examining publication of private information 
should find flat abnormal returns leading to the event and studies examining events 
based on public information, such as revision of transparent index, should find flat 
abnormal returns altogether.  
4.2.1 Event dates and windows 
Following Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), this study uses the event study 
methodology with two event dates, announcement (AD) and effective date (CD), for 
each inclusion and exclusion. The date the announcement is published is considered 
AD as due to transparent rules in the examined indices the content of the 
announcement is expected to be known in advance. Similarly, CD is taken as the date 
at the beginning of which the change is implemented as that is the date ETF’s are 
likely to rebalance their portfolios.  
Following Mackinlay (1997), the event study is conducted by indexing abnormal 
returns in event time by setting event time as t = 0 and setting t = 𝑇1 + 1 to t = 𝑇2 as 
the event window. Thus, the length of the event window is 𝐿1 = 𝑇1 − 𝑇0 and the 
length of the post-event window is 𝐿2 = 𝑇2 − 𝑇1.  
This study uses 7-day event window (-3:3) around the event dates in standard short-
term event study. Following Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) this study also explores 
five longer windows on a range from AD to CD - 10 to capture behaviour of the 
possible index premium. Rather than using standard event study methodology at a 
longer event window, such deviation is necessary to control cumulation of possible 
biases in abnormal returns and because the number of days between AD and CD 
varies from 5 to 31. Longer windows are explored by comparing their average 
abnormal returns based the number of days in each period for each stock. Run-up 
window from AD + 1 to CD -1 captures the returns stocks gain during the period 
between publication and effective day. Release window runs for CD to CD + 7 for 
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inclusions and CD + 5 for exclusions. Release window captures the reversal of price 
pressure from the effective day as assumed by the price pressure hypothesis. The 
length of the release window is based on the estimation on trading volume’s 
normalization from Lynch and Mendenhall (1997). Post-release window runs from 
the day after release window (CD + 8, CD + 6) to ten days after the effective day 
(CD + 10). Post-AD permanent 1 runs from AD + 1 to CD + 7 (CD + 5 for 
exclusions), consisting of run-up and release windows, while Post-AD permanent 2 
adds post-release window and runs from AD + 1 to CD + 10. Total permanent 1 and 
2 only add the announcement day to post-AD permanent windows and thus run from 
AD to CD + 7 (CD + 5 for exclusions) and AD to CD + 10. 
Following on Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) table 2 presents the period returns as 
expected by the theoretical framework. 
Table 2 Prediction of Hypotheses for Event Days and Event Windows 
        
Event Day - 
CAR Windows - MCAR 
       Post-AD  
Permanent 
Total  
Permanent 
  
Hypotheses AD 
CD - 
1 
Run-
up Release 
Post-
Release 
Price-pressure w/ no 
anticipation 0 + + 0 0 - 0 
Price-pressure w/ 
anticipation + 0 0 - 0 - 0 
Imperfect substitutes w/ 
no anticipation 0 + + + + 0 0 
Imperfect substitutes w/ 
anticipation + 0 0 0 + 0 0 
Information + 0 0 0 + 0 0 
Liquidity + 0 0 0 + 0 0 
Invstor awareness + 0 0 0 + 0 0 
The predictions presented are for inclusions. Predictions for exclusions would be exact opposites except for 
investor awareness hypothesis which predicts no effects for exclusions. 
 
4.2.2 Abnormal returns 
Following Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), the abnormal returns are calculated by 
subtracting index returns from stocks’ raw returns. The index used in calculating 
abnormal returns for large and mid cap stocks is OMX Nordic 120 which consists of 
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120 largest and most liquid stocks traded in OMX Helsinki, OMX Stockholm, OMX 
Copenhagen, and in Oslo Børs. Abnormal returns for stocks included in MSCI 
Nordic Country Small Cap Indices are calculated by subtracting OMX Nordic Small 
Cap PI returns from them. The indices consist of similar stocks as the indices studied 
but is rebalanced at different dates and is thus likely to give a reasonable benchmark 
about general performance of Nordic stock markets during the event periods without 
distorting the results.  
While this deviation from standard event study format where abnormal returns are 
calculated using a pricing model is not sophisticated, it has properties that especially 
benefit this study. First, it removes the need for an estimation period. This in 
beneficial because of the large amount of missing data and because of the multiple 
event dates. By the nature of the indices studied, stocks in the sample are likely to 
have outperformed the index prior to inclusion and respectively underperformed 
prior to exclusion, most pricing models would result in bias toward a higher (lower) 
alpha coefficient when the estimation period precedes inclusion (exclusion). With 
inclusions this problem could be avoided by using a very long estimation period, but 
which might become another problem with exclusions unless each stock has had very 
little index related activity during that period, an unlikely assumption. In fact, as the 
changes in stocks’ volume and companies’ market caps are likely to lead to similar 
events in various Nordic indices the supposed index premia may make the data 
around events generally “noisy” when considering each individual event. Second, the 
index captures cross correlation in stocks and thus removes the necessity of batching 
events with the same dates and of additional statistical procedures where event 
periods overlap. This conserves the amount of events and allows filtering the data 
more specifically.  
The main drawback of this method is that it does not capture the momentum in the 
stocks that lead to index events. Thus, stock specific momentum is included in the 
abnormal returns which may lead to bias in event study results. Caution is required 
when making inferences especially if the event period is long.  
Following Mackinlay (1997) abnormal return (CAR) is defined as 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2), from 
𝑡1 to 𝑡2, where 𝑇1 < 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡2 ≤ 𝑇2 by  
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
. 
(9) 
Cumulative abnormal returns are aggregated across the sample by 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅,
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
(10) 
 
 
𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2)) = [∑ 𝜎
2(𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
]
1
2
 
(11) 
 
 where  
 
𝜎2(𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡) =
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
. 
(12) 
Following Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), as this study uses two event dates per 
sample which have varying trading days between them, an average abnormal return 
(AAR) in addition to simple CAR is needed to evaluate periods of AD to CD. 
𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) is simply 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2) for the window divided by the number of days in 
the period. Different event windows are compared against each other using means of 
𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2), denoted as 𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) and of the sum of abnormal returns in the 
window denoted as 𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2). In cases where the period between AD and CD is 
long MCAR will be excessively high or low due to stocks momentum seeping in into 
abnormal returns. Similarly, MAAR will get higher values when the period between 
AD and CD is short and the premium cumulates faster. Together these metrics allow 
robust interpretation of results for windows which include the run-up period.  
44 
4.3 Subsetting and Tests 
In addition to running the event study with long term window analysis on the entire 
sample the data is subset into three more specific samples based on index 
characteristics in an attempt to capture drivers of index premium.  
The first subsample consists of events where stocks cross the lower boundary in 
MSCI Nordic Country Small Cap Indices. According to Petajisto (2011), small cap 
indices are more likely to have high index premium. Such assumption is supported 
by liquidity, investor awareness, and information hypotheses but small cap stocks 
may also be more likely to show a price reaction to mechanical excess demand from 
indexers. Events where stocks cross the upper boundary are excluded because in such 
cases the stock is included in or excluded from the respective MSCI Country Large a 
Mid Cap Index and thus such events are expected to have an opposite effect to 
‘normal’ exclusions and inclusions.  
The second subsample consists of MSCI Nordic Country Indices which together 
form the MSCI Nordic Countries Index and of FTSE Nordic 30 index. These indices 
are assumed to be the most liquid and to have the most amount of capital tracking 
them. As a region Nordics are more comparable to larger developed economies in 
Europe and thus region indices and products built upon them can be assumed to be 
more accessible to foreign investors and capital.  
The third subsample consists of all country specific blue-chip indices. While some of 
them are tracked by ETFs, membership in a country blue chip index is likely to have 
relatively large informational value. Thus, testing a sample of only blue-chip indices 
is likely to give cleanest look at information based price effects.  
Finally, for each test the development of index premium over time is explored by 
dividing the events into four batches of three years based on announcement year. 
Events from 2020 are included in the fourth batch. Mean cumulative abnormal 
returns for each event type and day are reported for each batch. Statistical 
significances of subsample mean cumulative abnormal returns are calculated with 
one-sided t-tests and two-sided t-tests against the mean of the entire period mean 
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abnormal returns of each event type and day. When MCAR and one-sided t1-
statistics are close to zero, t2-statistic confirms whether MCAR differs from the 
entire sample.   
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Total Sample 
Table 3 presents results for the total sample short term event study. Overall the 
results seem to support existence of index premium in Nordic stock markets but only 
at a magnitude that supports practical implications of EMH. Inclusion announcement 
appears to cause a modest, roughly 1% price increase that is statistically significant 
for the following days. Less than 60% of stocks in the sample present positive mean 
abnormal return for the period. The results for inclusion effective day show modest 
but mostly statistically insignificant price premium. Surprisingly and contrary to 
earlier empirical findings, a price decline that is larger in magnitude to that of 
inclusion announcement is found around exclusion announcement. Findings about 
exclusions are mostly statistically insignificant but possibly show a sharp decline in 
price at days -1 and 0 followed by sharp reversal, possibly showing signs of price 
pressure.  
Table 4 and table 5 present long window results for total sample inclusions and 
exclusions. All long-term windows for inclusions with the exception of release and 
post-release windows show similar roughly 2% total price increase measured by 
MCAR suggesting that most of the price premium cumulates between announcement 
and effective day. This is to an extent supported by the results in MAAR, although 
the relatively stable MAAR ranging from .07% to .1% might indicate that prices 
increase steadily across all windows and that relatively high MCAR in run-up 
window is due to its long length ranging from 5 to 30 days. Release and post-release 
windows for inclusions fail to capture a short-term price reversal supporting long-
term downward sloping demand curves (imperfect substitutes) or information-based 
theories.  
Long window results for total sample exclusions also show that most of the price 
impact takes place within run-up period. However, a positive reversal, although not 
statistically significant, is observed in release and post-release periods. Moderately 
higher MAAR for run-up period relative to longer periods supports this finding. 
These results imply possible price pressure around effective days for exclusions. 
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Table 4 
Long Window Statistics for Total Sample Inclusion Daily Market-Adjusted 
Returns  
Specific 
Event 
Window Event Days N MCAR t % > 0 
Run-up 
 
AD + 1, CD  - 1 339 1.79 % 4.06 57.52 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent   AD + 1, CD + 7 340 1.90 % 3.47 57.23 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 340 1.90 % 3.18 56.64 %  
Total 
Permanent   AD, CD + 7 340 1.97 % 3.57 56.34 %  
 
  AD, CD + 10 340 1.96 % 3.27 57.23 %  
Release   CD, CD + 7 339 0.12 % 0.36 51.18 %  
Post-release   CD + 8, CD + 10 334 -0.01 % 
-
0.03 50.15 %  
    
N MAAR t % > 0  
Run-up   AD + 1, CD  - 1 339 0.10 % 3.72 58.11 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent   AD + 1, CD + 7 340 0.07 % 3.88 57.23 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 340 0.06 % 3.82 57.52 %  
Total 
Permanent   AD, CD + 7 340 0.07 % 3.98 59.59 %  
    AD, CD + 10 340 0.06 % 3.92 59.29 % 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. MAAR presents the average of 
abnormal returns divided by the number of days in the period. t is one-sided t-test where CARs are tested 
against zero.  
 
 
Table 5 
Long Window Satistics for Total Sample Exclusion Daily Market-Adjusted 
Returns  
Specific Event 
Window Event Days N MCAR t % > 0 
Run-up 
 
AD + 1, CD  - 1 280 -2.55 % -4.09 43.93 % 
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 5 281 -1.80 % -2.50 45.36 % 
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 282 -1.59 % -1.60 42.50 % 
Total 
Permanent AD, CD + 5 281 -2.02 % -2.58 45.71 % 
 
AD, CD + 10 282 -1.81 % -1.75 42.14 % 
Release CD, CD + 5 280 0.74 % 1.56 54.12 % 
Post-release  CD + 6, CD + 10 281 0.20 % 0.28 49.46 % 
    
N MAAR t % > 0 
Run-up AD + 1, CD  - 1 280 -0.09 % -2.46 44.29 % 
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 5 281 -0.08 % -3.19 46.79 % 
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 282 -0.07 % -3.22 46.79 % 
Total 
Permanent AD, CD + 5 281 -0.08 % -3.00 44.29 % 
  AD, CD + 10 282 -0.07 % -3.08 45.36 % 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. MAAR presents the average of 
abnormal returns divided by the number of days in the period. t is one-sided t-test where CARs are tested 
against zero.  
 
 
50 
 
Table 6 shows average MCARs and statistics for -5:5 event periods by 3-4-year 
periods. Most of the t1-statistics are significant at 5% confidence level with 
significant MCARs signalling mild positive mean cumulative abnormal returns for 
periods around inclusion announcement and effective day. MCARs for exclusion 
announcement have steadily increased toward zero. Period around exclusion 
effective day has statistically significant ~2.5% price decline in 2008-2010 as 
measured by t1 and t2 statistics, but for the following periods are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero or from each other. 
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5.2 Small Caps 
Table 7 presents the event study results for MSCI Nordic Small Cap Indices. The 
inclusion announcement is followed by a relatively sharp increase in cumulative 
abnormal returns on day 1 and continues to increase slightly during the following 
days. Results for inclusion effective day are mostly insignificant. Cumulative returns 
around the exclusion announcement decline steadily to an average of -5% at day 5 
and are mostly statistically significant at 5% confidence level. Results for effective 
day of exclusion are mostly statistically insignificant but hint at a sharp drop in price 
at day -1 and a reversal at day 0.  
Table 6 Total Sample Index Premium Over Time 
 
Inclusions 
 
AD = 0, -5:5 CD = 0, -5:5 
Years N MCAR t1 t2 N MCAR t1 t2 
2008-2010 42 -0.62 % -2.23 -3.65 43 0.58 % 1.77 0.43 
2011-2013 64 -0.20 % -0.80 -2.46 64 0.45 % 2.38 0.10 
2014-2016 132 0.70 % 4.35 1.24 133 0.78 % 5.87 2.12 
2017-2020 95 1.15 % 5.69 3.02 94 -0.17 % -0.89 -2.86 
 
Exclusions 
 
AD = 0, -5:5 CD = 0, -5:5 
Years N MCAR t1 t2 N MCAR t1 t2 
2008-2010 39 -3.17 % -6.92 -3.82 38 -2.52 % -4.30 -3.74  
2011-2013 75 -1.92 % -5.85 -1.64 75 0.20 % 0.83 1.70  
2014-2016 88 -0.88 % -3.73 1.59 88 -0.08 % -0.39 0.76  
2017-2020 73 -0.66 % -2.71 2.37 74 -0.01 % -0.05 1.02 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. t1 is one-sided t-test where 
CARs are tested against zero. In t2 CARs are tested against total period CARs. 
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MSCI indices are constructed transparently and thus radical price reaction to 
announcements would not be expected. The fact that regardless of apparent 
transparency forecasting MSCI Small Cap Indices changes is unattainable for most 
investors may explain the mild observed price reaction via anticipation of indexing 
related excess demand and information-based theories. Similar reaction to exclusion 
announcement is not observed but instead abnormal returns decline steadily and with 
large magnitude. Sharp decline and reversal at exclusion effective day hints at 
existence of price pressure with release beginning at CD for small cap stocks.  
Tables 8 and 9 present long window results for small cap inclusions and exclusion. 
For inclusions most of the abnormal returns cumulate during run-up period and no 
reversal is observed. Larger portion of abnormal returns are positive for all periods 
when compared to total sample returns. Economically and statistically significant 
negative abnormal return cumulates over exclusions run-up period roughly half of 
which is reversed during release period. Results presented at tables 8 and 9 support 
price pressure hypothesis for exclusions but not for inclusions.  
The fact that results for exclusion show price pressure but the results for inclusions 
do not is peculiar. Previous literature does not offer direct explanation on why the 
behaviour would be se different for different kinds of events nor does it show similar 
empirical findings in terms of inclusions and exclusions behaving this way or of such 
relative magnitude where exclusions appear to cause larger effect.  
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Table 8 
Long Window Statistics for Small Cap Inclusions Daily Market-Adjusted 
Returns  
Specific Event 
Window Event Days N MCAR t % > 0 
Run-up 
 
AD + 1, CD  - 1 152 3.46 % 4.98 66.45 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 7 152 3.89 % 4.58 66.45 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 152 3.96 % 4.24 63.82 %  
Total Permanent AD, CD + 7 152 4.00 % 4.62 62.50 %  
 
AD, CD + 10 152 4.07 % 4.24 63.82 %  
Release CD, CD + 7 151 0.43 % 0.89 49.67 %  
Post-release CD + 8, CD + 10 151 0.07 % 0.24 51.66 %  
    
N MAAR t % > 0 
Run-up AD + 1, CD  - 1 152 0.19 % 5.56 69.08 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 7 152 0.14 % 5.37 66.45 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 152 0.13 % 5.25 67.11 %  
Total Permanent AD, CD + 7 152 0.13 % 5.37 69.74 %  
  AD, CD + 10 152 0.12 % 5.25 71.05 % 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. MAAR presents the average of 
abnormal returns divided by the number of days in the period. t is one-sided t-test where CARs are tested 
against zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Long Window Satistics for Small Cap Exclusions Daily Market-Adjusted 
Returns 
Specific Event 
Window Event Days N MCAR t % > 0 
Run-up 
 
AD + 1, CD  - 1 100 -6.26 % -5.07 28.00 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 5 101 -3.39 % -2.67 38.00 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 101 -3.98 % -2.62 36.00 %  
Total Permanent AD, CD + 5 101 -3.91 % -2.65 36.00 %  
 
AD, CD + 10 101 -4.50 % -2.68 37.00 %  
Release CD, CD + 5 100 2.84 % 3.11 65.66 %  
Post-release CD + 6, CD + 10 100 -0.60 % -0.81 52.53 %  
    
N MAAR t % > 0  
Run-up AD + 1, CD  - 1 100 -0.23 % -3.55 33.00 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 5 101 -0.18 % -4.14 35.00 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 101 -0.15 % -3.96 35.00 %  
Total Permanent AD, CD + 5 101 -0.19 % -3.87 28.00 %  
  AD, CD + 10 101 -0.16 % -3.70 29.00 % 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. MAAR presents the average of 
abnormal returns divided by the number of days in the period. t is one-sided t-test where CARs are tested 
against zero.  
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Development of small cap index premium is presented in table 10. MCAR for 2008-
2010 period inclusion announcement is surprisingly negative and statistically 
significant. Most of the negative MCAR derives from two stocks that appear to have 
declined ~26% and ~15% during the event period. However, as CARs deviate much 
during 2008-2010 and there are similar outlierish observations to the upside as well, 
doctoring the data by removing the strongly negative values cannot be justified. 
Regardless of high t-statistics, this result should not be considered significant. 
Similarly, the strongly negative result for 2008-2010 is based on only 15 events and 
probably not reliable regardless of the high t-statistics. Probable explanation for the 
very high t-values is that they are calculated using each day return from each event as 
an observation. Zeros imputed in place of missing values in stock return calculation 
cause cumulative abnormal return to remain the same on days for which prior day 
stock price was missing from the initial data. As a result, data points which are 
surrounded by missing values can constitute as up to eleven observations. It is 
possible that the small cap stocks in the sample were illiquid and volatile during 
2008-2010. Therefore, a high N should be considered a requirement for significance 
in these tests. 
 
Table 10 Small Cap  Index Premium Over Time 
 
Inclusions 
 
AD = 0, -5:5 CD = 0, -5:5 
Years N MCAR t1 t2 N MCAR t1 t2 
2008-2010 23 -2.01 % -6.22 -8.29 23 1.90 % 4.74 2.73 
2011-2013 22 1.69 % 3.72 1.35 22 1.32 % 4.27 1.70 
2014-2016 59 0.91 % 3.18 -0.35 59 0.51 % 2.91 -1.05 
2017-2020 43 2.28 % 6.67 3.25 42 0.02 % 0.07 -2.06 
 
Exclusions 
 
AD = 0, -5:5 CD = 0, -5:5 
Years N MCAR t1 t2 N MCAR t1 t2 
2008-2010 16 -2.52 % -3.33 0.24 15 -8.04 % -9.15 -7.39  
2011-2013 27 -2.81 % -3.90 -0.11 27 0.23 % 0.47 2.62  
2014-2016 27 -2.77 % -4.99 -0.08 27 -0.91 % -1.95 0.62  
2017-2020 25 -2.50 % -5.37 0.39 26 0.37 % 0.87 3.23 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. t1 is one-sided t-test where 
CARs are tested against zero. In t2 CARs are tested against total period CARs. 
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5.3 Nordic Region  
Table 11 presents event study results for MSCI Nordic Countries Index and FTSE 
Nordic 30. A positive and a negative price effects take place around inclusion and 
exclusion announcements, both being mostly significant as measured by t-statistic. 
The economic magnitude of exclusion announcement is about twice as large as of 
inclusion announcement. Surprisingly, exclusion effective day is preceded and 
followed by economically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns that at 
some points are significant also statistically. In fact, the results might be interpreted 
to show a drop from elevated values and a reversal at day 1. Although there is no 
clear explanation for positive abnormal returns few days before exclusion effective 
day, the reversal supports price pressure hypothesis. However, the effective day for 
inclusion shows no abnormalities.  
Table 12 presents long window results for region indices inclusions and table 13 for 
exclusions. All long window results for inclusions are flat and statistically 
insignificant indicating that the ~2% premium that has cumulated at day 0 relative to 
announcement remains in the price for the entire period until CD + 10. The results 
for exclusions are similar except for ~6.5% positive abnormal return in post-release 
period, which is not statistically significant. Results for these region indices show 
support for long-term downward sloping demand curves with anticipation and for 
information-based theories, but the peculiar result for exclusions post-release period 
potentially undermines this conclusion. However, the fact that the negative abnormal 
returns during exclusion announcement period are much larger than the positive 
abnormal returns at inclusion announcement contradicts with investor awareness 
hypothesis.  
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Table 12 
Long Window Statistics for Region Inclusions Daily Market-Adjusted 
Returns 
Specific Event 
Window Event Days N MCAR t % > 0 
Run-up 
 
AD + 1, CD  - 1 36 -0.07 % -0.06 47.22 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 7 36 -0.60 % -0.28 50.00 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 36 -0.10 % -0.04 50.00 %  
Total 
Permanent AD, CD + 7 36 0.31 % 0.15 52.78 %  
 
AD, CD + 10 36 0.82 % 0.37 58.33 %  
Release CD, CD + 7 36 -0.53 % -0.40 52.78 %  
Postrelease CD + 8, CD + 10 35 0.52 % 0.74 51.43 %  
    
N MAAR t % > 0  
Run-up AD + 1, CD  - 1 36 0.01 % 0.07 47.22 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 7 36 -0.02 % -0.29 41.67 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 36 -0.02 % -0.35 44.44 %  
Total 
Permanent AD, CD + 7 36 0.02 % 0.41 47.22 %  
  AD, CD + 10 36 0.02 % 0.31 47.22 % 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. MAAR presents the average of 
abnormal returns divided by the number of days in the period. t is one-sided t-test where CARs are tested 
against zero.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 13 
Long Window Satistics for Region Exclusions Daily Market-Adjusted 
Returns 
Specific Event 
Window Event Days N MCAR t % > 0 
Run-up 
 
AD + 1, CD  - 1 37 0.43 % 0.21 59.46 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 5 37 -0.43 % -0.15 54.05 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 37 6.10 % 1.13 56.76 %  
Total 
Permanent AD, CD + 5 37 -1.06 % -0.35 51.35 %  
 
AD, CD + 10 37 5.47 % 1.01 51.35 %  
Release CD, CD + 5 37 -0.86 % -0.48 45.95 %  
Postrelease  CD + 6, CD + 10 37 6.53 % 1.36 67.57 %  
    
N MAAR t % > 0 
Run-up AD + 1, CD  - 1 37 -0.03 % -0.29 45.95 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 5 37 0.02 % 0.16 64.86 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 37 0.03 % 0.34 67.57 %  
Total 
Permanent AD, CD + 5 37 -0.03 % -0.29 64.86 %  
  AD, CD + 10 37 0.00 % -0.04 64.86 % 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. MAAR presents the average of 
abnormal returns divided by the number of days in the period. t is one-sided t-test where CARs are tested 
against zero.  
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5.4 Country Blue Chips 
Tables 15, 16, and 17 show the short-term event study and long window results for 
inclusions and exclusions from all the blue-chip indices. The results show both 
economically and statistically insignificant abnormal returns with the exception of 
some values here and there. Overall the event study does not capture any sign of 
index premium or abnormal behaviour of prices around Nordic blue-chip index 
composition changes. This is puzzling because many of those indices are tracked by 
at least some capital and membership in them can be assumed to have positive 
informational value. Previous literature and empirical evidence suggest that such 
properties generate an index premium that arbitrageurs exploit only to the extent at 
which it provides opportunity for risk adjusted excess returns. If a detectable 
component of index premium is explained by idiosyncratic risk as Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya (2002) and Petajisto (2011) suggest, then failing to detect any index 
premium in Nordic blue-chip indices raises the question whether the idiosyncratic 
risk around index composition changes is so small that arbitrageurs eliminate the 
premium completely or if those changes generate premium at all.  
Table 14 Region Index Premium Over Time 
 
Inclusions 
 
AD = 0, -5:5 CD = 0, -5:5 
Years N MCAR t1 t2 N MCAR t1 t2 
2008-2010 10 1.40 % 2.21 -0.03 10 0.10 % 0.24 0.00 
2011-2013 4 1.81 % 2.10 0.43 4 0.71 % 1.03 0.82 
2014-2016 13 1.37 % 3.57 -0.11 13 0.05 % 0.09 -0.09 
2017-2020 3 3.71 % 7.87 4.22 3 1.56 % 2.88 2.41 
  Exclusions 
 
AD = 0, -5:5 CD = 0, -5:5 
Years N MCAR t1 t2 N MCAR t1 t2 
2008-2010 15 -3.31 % -4.85 -1.07 14 2.10 % 2.16 0.19  
2011-2013 7 -1.47 % -1.44 0.90 7 4.65 % 5.69 2.95  
2014-2016 6 -5.05 % -6.49 -2.95 6 1.73 % 2.33 -0.19  
2017-2020 4 -3.17 % -3.27 -0.68 4 0.50 % 1.05 -2.15 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. t1 is one-sided t-test where 
CARs are tested against zero. In t2 CARs are tested against total period CARs. 
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The results from region indices where traces of the premium were found point 
toward the latter option as there is no conceivable reason why the idiosyncratic risk 
would be smaller at blue chip index composition changes.  
 
 
 
Table 16 
Long Window Statistics for Blue Chip Inclusions Daily Market-Adjusted 
Returns 
Specific Event 
Window Event Days N MCAR t % > 0 
Run-up 
 
AD + 1, CD  - 1 
 
175 0.59 % 1.03 51.43 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 7 
 
176 0.51 % 0.72 50.86 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 176 0.49 % 0.63 52.00 %  
Total 
Permanent AD, CD + 7 176 0.48 % 0.68 52.57 %  
 
AD, CD + 10 176 0.46 % 0.61 53.14 %  
Release CD, CD + 7 176 -0.07 % -0.16 52.00 %  
Postrelease CD + 8, CD + 10 171 -0.02 % -0.07 49.41 %  
    
N MAAR t % > 0 
Run-up AD + 1, CD  - 1 
 
175 0.04 % 0.86 49.71 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 7 176 0.02 % 0.96 50.86 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 176 0.02 % 0.92 50.86 %  
Total 
Permanent AD, CD + 7 176 0.02 % 0.96 52.57 %  
  AD, CD + 10 176 0.02 % 0.93 50.86 % 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. MAAR presents the average of 
abnormal returns divided by the number of days in the period. t is one-sided t-test where CARs are tested 
against zero.  
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Finally, table 18 present the -5:5 period MCARs and statistics for blue chip index 
inclusion and exclusion announements and effective days at batches of 3-4 years. 
Surprisingly the results show that the event period MCAR for exclusion 
announcements has risen from -3.24% at 2008-2010 to .58% at 2017-2020 while 
being mostly statistically significant as measured by t1 and t2. 2008-2013 have 
relatively significant negative MCARs for exclusion announcement while the 
corresponding metrics for 2014-2020 are closer to zero. As a result, t2-statistic for 
exclusion announcement is high. It would appear that MCARs for exclusion 
announcement event periods have in fact increased from negative to slightly positive, 
but as these statistics have proven to be unreliable when data is scarce and noisy and 
event study results for the whole period do not signal any abnormal price behaviour, 
such conclusion would be reckless.  
 
Table 17 
Long Window Satistics for Blue Chip Exclusions Daily Market-Adjusted 
Returns 
Specific 
Event 
Window Event Days N MCAR t % > 0 
Run-up 
 
AD + 1, CD  - 1 168 -0.41 % -0.61 52.38 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 5 168 -1.11 % -1.23 48.21 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 169 -0.40 % -0.30 46.43 %  
Total
Permanent AD, CD + 5 168 -1.10 % -1.18 50.60 %  
 
AD, CD + 10 169 -0.40 % -0.29 45.24 %  
Release CD, CD + 5 168 -0.70 % -1.32 47.02 %  
Postrelease CD + 6, CD + 10 169 0.70 % 0.62 47.62 %  
    
N MAAR t % > 0  
Run-up AD + 1, CD  - 1 168 0.00 % -0.07 51.19 %  
Post-AD 
Permanent AD + 1, CD + 5 168 -0.03 % -0.88 52.38 %  
  
AD + 1, CD + 10 169 -0.03 % -1.11 52.38 %  
Total
Permanent AD, CD + 5 168 -0.02 % -0.53 52.98 %  
  AD, CD + 10 169 -0.02 % -0.84 54.17 % 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. MAAR presents the average of 
abnormal returns divided by the number of days in the period. t is one-sided t-test where CARs are tested 
against zero.  
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5.5 Limitations 
The methodology and data used in this thesis impose some limitations on 
interpretation of the results. Acknowledging them is critical for correct conclusions.  
Release and post-release windows may have incorrect length. Lynch and Mendenhall 
(1997) use return of abnormal trading volume to normal as a proxy for when release 
period ends. As such analysis is not possible here, the lengths of release period are 
taken as they are in Lynch and Mendenhall (1997). Considering that this thesis uses 
over a decade newer data and from different market and different kind of indices, 
using the same release window lengths is close to an arbitrary guess, which however 
does seem work reasonably. 
Method for calculating the small cap abnormal returns may be inadequate. In fact, for 
the entire sample of stock returns the average daily return is .138% while the average 
daily return for the index is only .018%. The method for calculating the abnormal 
returns exposes them for possible momentum which could be assumed to be larger 
for small cap stocks. This bias would materialize as inflated abnormal returns near 
inclusion and deflated abnormal returns near exclusion due to endogenous 
component remaining in the abnormal returns but should not affect short term 
relative changes in cumulative abnormal returns. Utilizing market model or even 
Table 18 Blue Chip Index Premium Over Time 
 
Inclusions 
 
AD = 0, -5:5 CD = 0, -5:5 
Years N MCAR t1 t2 N MCAR t1 t2 
2008-2010 14 0.07 % 0.14 0.47 15 0.46 % 0.96 0.32 
2011-2013 41 -1.44 % -5.14 -4.09 41 -0.18 % -0.76 -1.82 
2014-2016 67 0.44 % 2.34 2.73 68 0.84 % 4.28 2.33 
2017-2020 47 0.08 % 0.32 0.93 47 -0.19 % -0.78 -1.82 
  Exclusions 
 
AD = 0, -5:5 CD = 0, -5:5 
Years N MCAR t1 t2 N MCAR t1 t2 
2008-2010 21 -3.24 % -5.36 -4.61 20 0.77 % 0.99 0.72  
2011-2013 46 -1.21 % -3.79 -2.38 46 0.05 % 0.21 -0.51  
2014-2016 55 0.29 % 1.31 2.41 55 0.18 % 0.79 -0.08  
2017-2020 42 0.58 % 2.11 2.98 42 -0.17 % -0.61 -1.18 
MCAR presents the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for given period. t1 is one-sided t-test where 
CARs are tested against zero. In t2 CARs are tested against total period CARs. 
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some more sophisticated economic or statistical model would be appropriate but 
creates other issues that are avoided here. 
Because similar indices consist of generally similar stocks the potential for a stock to 
be included in multiple indices is especially high for small stock markets in the 
Nordics. Having multiple events for stocks makes the definition of ‘clean’ estimation 
period difficult. Thus, the implicit assumption in this study is that all events are 
‘equal’ although that might be unreasonable. Stocks being included and having evens 
in multiple indices also raises a need or a possibility for controlling the events based 
on the number of indices the stocks are part of during them. Comparing the impact of 
events based on such control would present opportunities for more specific tests or 
information-based hypotheses but would also require larger sample and utilization of 
panel regression instead of classic event study.  
The price data from investing.com might not be of very high quality at least from 
2008-2011 period and causes issues that might distort some of the results of this 
study to some extent even when they are dealt with conservative imputation and 
filtering. It is unclear whether the issues could be avoided by using different data 
source or if their source are the Nordic exchanges or markets themselves.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
This study focused on the effects of index composition changes on affected assets 
prices in Nordic stock markets in order to find whether this market exhibits index 
premium phenomenon. Using events study methodology with long window 
extension from Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) a total of eighteen Nordic indices from 
four different providers were examined in four different combinations to capture 
drivers and characteristics of the premium.  
The results show traces of index premium in the total sample which behaves 
differently to that of different markets found in earlier literature. Where the 
theoretical framework and empirical findings typically show that the price effect of 
index composition changes behaves inversely for inclusions and exclusions but with 
larger magnitude with inclusions, the results here show that inclusions cause a subtle 
price impact when announced and no price impact when implemented, while the 
results for exclusions show significant decline in price around announcement and 
somewhat significant decline with traces of short term reversal around exclusion 
effective day. Long window results show that most of abnormal price action happens 
between the announcement and implementation.  
Further examination shows similar behavior but with a larger magnitude of the 
premium for small cap stocks. Small cap stocks react to inclusion announcements 
with positive price increase that continues until the effective day and does not revert 
in near term. Exclusion of small cap stocks causes a significant price decline around 
announcement and a significant short-term price decline with short term reversal 
around the effective day. When blue chip stocks are included and excluded from 
indices covering the whole region their prices react to the announcements but show 
insignificant abnormal behavior round the effective days. Inclusions and exclusions 
from country specific blue-chip indices do not appear to cause abnormal price 
reactions.  
The difference in magnitude of the price effects between inclusion and exclusion is 
puzzling but also the difference in their behavior contradicts the theoretical 
framework from academic literature. Positive reaction to inclusion announcements 
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supports information-based theories and demand-based theories with the assumption 
that market anticipates the excess demand at effective day. However, the indices 
studied here are constructed transparently and therefore anticipating the content of 
the announcements is possible with high accuracy. Similarly, they do not disclose 
private information that would justify sharp reaction. The lack of abnormal price 
reactions around inclusion effective day shows that at that time the informational 
effects of index inclusion as well as the expectation of non-fundamental excess 
demand from indexers are correctly incorporated to prices as the efficient market 
hypothesis suggests. However, when stocks are removed from indices the behavior 
of the price effect changes drastically.  The exclusion announcement causes a sharp 
price decline only in exclusions from region indices while small cap stocks decline 
significantly but smoothly around exclusion announcement. This kind of behavior is 
what information-based theories and demand-based theories assuming anticipation 
suggest but they do not provide explanation on why the price impact is larger for 
exclusions and why prices react to announcements as if they disclosed private 
information. Small cap stocks show a short and significant price drop followed by a 
sharp reversal of roughly 50-60% of the drop. This suggests a release of price 
pressure as price pressure hypothesis suggests but in this form the price pressure 
hypothesis is not supported by similar reversals in inclusions. Finally, the lack of 
abnormal price reactions for events in country specific blue-chip indices, which 
supposedly are tracked by less capital than region spanning ones hints at the 
possibility that the index premium in Nordic stock markets is driven more by excess 
demand than by informational effects.  
The data and research methods used in this study cannot answer whether the effects 
found present arbitrage opportunities or if they are covered by idiosyncratic risk. As 
the magnitude of the price reactions are generally smaller than those found in 
previous literature, one should not expect exploitable opportunities based on this 
study. Similarly, while the possible index turnover cost cannot be calculated based 
on these data and results, the results here are not excessively alarming from passive 
investors’ and index providers’ point of view. Still, as the results indicate that at least 
for the small cap and regional indices studied here the stocks appear to enter the 
indices at inflated price and to exit them after significant declines, the extent of the 
index turnover cost for these indices could be looked into in future research or by 
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practitioners. Significant index turnover cost might signal a need for index neutral 
passive investing products that rebalance their portfolios based on transparent index 
construction rules but at different times to those of the actual index.  
Although the results here are not generalizable due to the uniqueness of Nordic 
market, the timeframe of the study, and to limitations in data and methodology, the 
extent of index premium and its peculiar behavior found in this study suggest that the 
research topic on index premium should be re-examined. Future studies could repeat 
earlier studies of the S&P 500 effect on current data to examine how the 
phenomenon has developed during the last decade. The possible results could shed 
light on the results here and either challenge or confirm the near hegemony of 
passive investments supremacy among retail investors and institutions.  
To conclude, this thesis does in fact find traces of index premium in Nordic stock 
markets but fails to make further conclusions about it.  
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